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INTRODUCTION
In this issue the Denver Law Center Journal introduces a
number of new policies in conjunction with its annual One Year
Review of Colorado Law. This year the review has been written
entirely by students. Cases appearing in the review have been
selected on the basis of legal significance, in either the development
or the clarification of a point of law. An occasional case has been
included because of its particular factual interest.
Concomitant with the reduction in the number of cases treated,
an attempt has been made to effect a somewhat more critical
analysis of each case, where possible, rather than a mere exposition
of the action of the supreme court. Furthermore, a few cases of
importance have been omitted from the review in favor of a more
elaborate treatment in subsequent issues in the form of case com-
ments or case notes.
The editors are optimistic in their opinion that this new format
will prove to be more useful to members of the bar.
ONE YEAR REVIEW OF AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS,
CORPORATIONS, AND MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
BY JACK MCCONNELL*
I. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
Surprisingly enough, Bunzell v. City of Golden' presented the
Supreme Court of Colorado with its first opportunity to consider
the powers of a city to revoke a 3.2% retail beer license. The facts
motivating the attempted revocation are found only in Justice
McWilliams' dissenting opinion:
[There was satisfactory evidence] that malt beverage
was served to minors (under 18 years); that hard liquor
(rum) was consumed on the premises; that beer over the
content of 3.2 was consumed on the premises. (Hienbrau);
that the officers were called many times to answer disturb-
ance charges; that loud noises were permitted to occur; that
indecent acts were observed; that insults were used and a
female accosted.
One observer noted the carrying away of a teen-ager
in an intoxicated condition. Drag racing and other acts
which make the exercising of the police power of the
municipality mandatory [were also observed]2
* Senior Student, University of Denver College of Low.
1 378 P.2d 208 (Colo. 1963).
2 Id. at 210-211.
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The trial court upheld the city council's revocation of the
license, and the defendants brought error to the supreme court.
The city argued to the supreme court that the city's power to grant
a license implied the power to revoke it for cause. This argument
was rejected. In reversing the lower court's decision, the supreme
court held that C.R.S. '53 § 75-1-14 requires that the revocation
of a 3.2% beer license "cannot be effected in the absence of a con-
viction of an offense described as a misdemeanor ' 3 by that article.
The court emphasized these words of the section: "[U] pon such
conviction any license granted and issued under the provisions
of this article to said person so convicted may be revoked. . . ."I
While the evidence seemed to show that beverages containing
over 3.2% alcohol were consumed on the premises, it was not shown
that this was done with the defendants' permission. Justice Moore's
majority opinion points out that "there are no findings that
Bunzell sold, possessed, or 'permitted the consumption on the
premises' of any beverages containing alcohol in excess of three and
two-tenths per cent"5 as prohibited by C.R.S. '53 § 75-1-12. This
section provides that any such violation "shall immediately cause
• . . cancellation of the license granted under this article." Justice
Moore said that this section "is not involved in the instant case
and this opinion is not to be construed as applicable to any situation
which might arise under said section."6
Justice McWilliams' dissent adopts the city's argument that the
power to issue the license carried with it the power to revoke, and
that this power was in addition to the power to revoke under
section 12 and 14.7 No authority for this conclusion is cited.
It is difficult to agree with the dissent in the face of the statu-
tory command of section 14. Its language clearly requires a convic-
tion before a license can be revoked. Moreover, requiring a con-
viction for violation of the statute before revocation of the license
is a desirable safeguard to prevent arbitrary and capricious action
by municipalities; this procedure is reasonable and will not unduly
burden any municipality in the supervision of its 3.2% beer
licensees.
In Bingham v. Bach,8 certain policemen employed by the City
and County of Denver attempted unsuccessfully to enjoin the
Civil Service Commission of the City and County of Denver from
certifying any promotion list containing preference for employees
with service-connected disability of less than ten per cent. The
plaintiffs contended that Colo. Const. art. XII, section 14, does not
define "disability"; therefore, reference should be made
to applicable presidential proclamations under which au-
thority the department of war, navy department and the
United States veterans administration were or are em-
powered to so certify service-connected disabilities. And
that under said statutes and proclamations only disability
ratings of at least ten per cent are authorized.9
3 Id. at 209.
4 Ibid.
5 Id. at 210.
6 Ibid.
7 Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 75-1-12, 14 (1953).
8 377 P.2d 741 (Colo. 1963).
9 Id. at 743.
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Section 14 of article XII of the state constitution provides that
five points shall be added to the grades of candidates honorably
discharged from the armed forces; and that an additional five
points shall be added if such candidate also "incurred disability
in the line of duty while so serving" and was so discharged.
The trial court's refusal to grant the injunction was upheld.
Justice Moore said, "The veterans preference provision of the
constitution contains no language limiting its application to a
percentage of disability, and so may not reasonably be interpreted
as contended for by plaintiffs."'10
II. CORPORATIONS
There were few Colorado decisions in 1963 concerning cor-
porate law. The only significant case from the standpoint of the
law involved was Goeddel v. Aircraft Finance, Inc.," which in-
terpreted portions of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act12 for the
first time.
In August, 1951, plaintiff Goeddel and one Vest (now deceased)
entered into an agreement for sale to the plaintiff of certain
corporate stock. The plaintiff gave Vest a check and a note for the
balance. The note was to be paid out of the profits of the company.
No attempt was made to transfer title by way of separate written
instrument or by the delivery of the stock. A disagreement arose
between the two in November or December of the same year, and
Vest gave the plaintiff a check which he endorsed as payment in
full for all the plaintiff's interest in the company. The plaintiff
testified that within the next eight to ten months Vest attempted
to "settle" but that the plaintiff refused. Just why there was any-
thing left to "settle" when plaintiff seemingly had been paid in
full for his interest was not discussed in the opinion. The plaintiff
further testified that he decided he would do nothing about the
matter as long as Vest was alive.
Vest died on September 14, 1960. On December 20 of that year,
the plaintiff demanded to examine the books of the corporation but
was refused. This action to establish the plaintiff's ownership of the
stock was filed on January 23, 1961. This was more than eight years
subsequent to the last dealings between the plaintiff and Vest.
The trial court's dismissal of the action was affirmed by the
supreme court. Justice Sutton said that under sections nine and ten
of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act,1 the plaintiff was neither a
stockholder in the corporation at the time the action was brought
nor could he compel the corporation to make him a stockholder.
10 id. at 745.
11 382 P.2d 812 (Colo. 1963).
12 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 31-9-1 to 22 (1953).
13 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 31-9-9 (1953): "The delivery of a certificate by the person appearing by
the certificate to be the owner thereof without the indorsement requisite for the transfer of the
certificate and the shares represented thereby, but with intent to transfer such certificates or shares,
shall impose an obligation, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, upon the person so
delivering, to complete the transfer by making the necessary indorsement. The transfer shall take
effect as of the time when the indorsement is actually made. This obligation may be specifically
enforced."
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 31-9-10 (1953): "An attempted transfer of title to a certificate or to the shares
represented thereby without delivery of the certificate shall have the effect of a promise to
transfer and the obligation, if any, imposed by such promise shall be determined by the law
governing the formation and performance of contracts."
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The court followed a recent Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals deci-
sion 14 quoting the following:
When these statutes [sections nine and ten] are considered
together, it is clear that in Colorado legal title to shares of
stock issued by a corporation organized under the law of
that state can be effectively transferred in only one or the
other of two methods. One method is by delivery of the cer-
tificate with an endorsement thereon in blank or to a speci-
fied person, signed by the person appearing in the certifi-
cate to be the owner thereof. The other is by delivery of the
certificate and a separate document containing a written
assignment or a power of attorney to sell, assign, or transfer
the same, signed by the person appearing in the certificate
to be the owner of the stock. These methods are exclusive,
and any attempt to transfer stack without delivery of the
certificate does not have the effect of passing title but mere-
ly constitutes a promise to transfer.15
Since the plaintiff had no title to the stock at the time the
action was brought, the court said he had "at best" a claim for relief
against Vest's executors to complete transfer of the stock to him.
But this claim was barred by the six year statute of limitations
applicable to actions founded on contract.16
Colorado Ass'n of Accountants v. Colorado Society of Certified
Public Accountants 7 was of factual interest. Reversing the trial
court, the supreme court held that the defendants' use of the name
"Public Accountants Society of Colorado" was not confusingly simi-
lar to the name "Colorado Society of Certified Public Accountants."
The defendants had not violated an injunction restraining the de-
fendants from doing business under the name "Colorado Society of
Public Accountants" or another term so similar as to mislead or
deceive the public or as to lead to uncertainty or confusion.
III. AGENCY
In contrast to the profusion of agency cases in recent years,
only one 1963 decision concerned agency law.
Public Employees' Retirement Ass'n v. Johnson's was an action
by a member of the state's employees' retirement association to
recover money paid by him into the Association. The plaintiff John-
son had executed a document in favor of the credit union from
which he obtained a loan. The document read:
So long as this note remains unpaid, I hereby appoint
. . . the Colorado State Employees Credit Union to be my
attorney-in-fact and in case I should cease to be employed
by the State of Colorado to demand and receive any moneys
or credits payable to me from the State of Colorado, or from
any bank, employees retirement fund, or other depository
19
The plaintiff resigned from state employment. On the day of
14 Brennan v. W. A. Wills, Ltd., 263 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 902 (1959).
15 382 P.2d at 814. (Emphasis added by the court.)
16 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 87-1-11(4) (1953).
17 384 P.2d 94 (Colo. 1963).
18 385 P.2d 415 (Colo. 1963).
19 Id. at 416. (Emphasis added by the court.)
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resignation, he made a formal demand on the defendant Association
for refund of the money deposited to his credit. On the same day the
Credit Union filed the "power of attorney" document with the de-
fendant. A week later, the plaintiff revoked this power and two days
later demanded his funds from the defendant again. On the same
day the Association paid over the funds to the Credit Union which
credited them to the plaintiff's loan account. On subsequent demand
for his funds, and another refusal by the defendant, this action was
instituted.
The trial court held that the document signed by plaintiff was
an equitable assignment coupled with an interest and void by the
terms of the statute governing public employees' retirement sys-
tems. This statute in part provides:
Funds not subject to process.-None of the moneys, annui-
ties or other benefits mentioned in this article shall be
assignable either in law or equity or subject to execution,
levy, attachment, garnishment or other legal process, and
shall be exempt from any state income tax.
2 '1
The supreme court sustained the judgment for the plaintiff but
held that the reasoning of the trial court's decision was erroneous.
Justice Day said that the document did not assign or transfer any
interest to the Credit Union, and therefore the appointment was
revocable. Since the defendant Association received both the de-
mand by the power of attorney and the plaintiff's demand before
any money had been paid out, it made no difference which demand
was received first. The plaintiff's demand for the entire amount to
be paid directly to him superseded the power of attorney and put
the Association on notice of the revocation of the power. The plain-
tiff was therefore entitled to receive his money from the Associa-
tion.
In a specially concurring opinion, Justice Hall condemned the
obvious effort of the parties to avoid prohibitions of section 20:
"Inescapably, Johnson, the Credit Union and the Association,
through their devious means, succeeded in accomplishing that which
the legislature sought to prevent .... [These] procedures . . . are
approved" by the majority.2 ' Justice Hall would have found, as the
trial court did, that there was an equitable assignment of funds
which is declared void by the statute.
This position is more convincing than that of the majority. As
Justice Hall points out, the majority's opinion clears the way for
the Credit Union and the Public Employees' Retirement Association
to circumvent the clear legislative intent of section twenty. By sim-
ply limiting the loan to the amount which the borrowers have in
their retirement fund, the Credit Union has a 100% security on its
loans. The only stumbling block is that the borrower may revoke
the power of attorney as Johnson did.
IV. PARTNERSHIPS
Realty Dev. Co. v. Feit22 apparently broadened the criteria for
establishing a joint venture in Colorado. The plaintiff sued the
20 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 111-1-20 (1953).
21 385 P.2d at 418.
22 387 P.2d 898 (Colo. 1963).
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Gamble Land and Development Company and the Realty Develop-
ment Company for salary and commission due for services rendered.
It was not disputed that Gamble had hired the plaintiff and had
defaulted in its obligation to pay him. The plaintiff, however, sought
to join the Realty Development Company as party defendant on the
theory of a joint venture. Gamble and Realty had a written agree-
ment which provided that Gamble was to pay Realty 500 dollars for
each home sold in return for financial assistance. There was no
agreement to share losses, and the payment was not contingent upon
Gamble's making a profit.
The lower court found that a joint venture existed and rendered
judgment against both defendants. The supreme court reversed the
judgment of the trial court and, quoting from an Oklahoma deci-
sion ,23 adopted the following requirements as necessary for the
establishment of a joint venture:
(1) There must be joint interest in the property by the
parties sought to be held as partners; (2) there must be
agreements, express or implied, to share in the profits -and
losses of the venture; and (3) there must be actions and
conduct showing co-operation in the project. None of these
elements alone is sufficient.
24
The court then held that since there was no agreement between the
defendants to share in profits and losses, no joint venture existed.
The necessity of an agreement to share in profits and losses had
been previously emphasized in Fedderson v. Goode.2 5 In Fedderson
the court approved the following language from another Oklahoma
case, Commercial Lumber Co. v. Nelson: 26 "The chief characteristic
of a joint adventure is a joint and not a several profit.
27
The possibility of mutual profit or loss was also used as the
test of a joint venture in Austin v. Stephen.28 Therein, the court
relied upon the following quotation from Corpus Juris:
29
When the agreement provides that both . . . the parties
thereto shall contribute money to be used in the purchase
of lands . . to be sold for their mutual benefit in ... speci-
fied proportions .. .the transaction, in the absence of some
special provision of the contract, indicating that the parties
intended to assume some other relation, has, almost invari-
ably, been construed to be one of the joint adventure as
to give each of the parties ... an interest in the property.
30
Since the decision in Realty Development Co. rested on the
absence of an agreement to share profits and losses, this case could
have been decided on the basis of the Fedderson and Austin cases
cited above. The remaining two criteria set up by the court (joint
interest in the property and conduct showing cooperation in the
project) were not necessary to the decision. Future litigants seeking
to establish the existence of a joint venture, however, should expect
to have to meet all three criteria recited in Realty.
23 White v. Houston Lumber Co., 179 Okla. 89, 64 P.2d 908 (1937).
24 387 P.2d at 899. (Emphasis added by the court.)
25 112 Colo. 38, 145 P.2d 981 (1944).
26 181 Okla. 122, 72 P.2d 829 (1937).
27 112 Colo. at 47, 145 P.2d 981, 985.
28 89 Colo. 177, 300 Pac. 364 (1931).
29 33 C. J. Joint Adventures § 16 (1924).
30 89 Colo. at 181, 300 Pac. 364, 366.
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